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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the relationship between the federal
and state governments has changed, at least in part, because the
U.S. Supreme Court has begun to take federalism concerns quite seriously and has treated the Eleventh Amendment1 as offering much
more protection to the states than it ever before had been thought to
offer. One of the most interesting facets of the Court’s recent discovery of the breadth and depth of the Eleventh Amendment lies in the
explanation offered for that interpretation, which cannot be
grounded in its text, original intent, or even good public policy, but
nonetheless has gained the allegiance of a majority of the Court. 2
Alden v. Maine3 is a good example both of the Court’s new-found
jurisprudential method and of the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between the majority and minority positions on federalism issues. The
Alden majority misconstrued history to contradict the Framers’
stated intentions and to provide an understanding of the constitutional structure that the Framers almost certainly would have rejected. The Alden minority, while more plausibly characterizing the
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A., Harvard College; M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Chicago; J.D., Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Susan Gilles for her insightful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”).
2. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
3. Id.
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historical views of the Framers, nonetheless failed to establish why
those same Framers relied on by the majority would have rejected
the majority’s position. This Article shows why Madison, Marshall,
and Hamilton all would have rejected the Court’s current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence and why the arguments offered in Alden
are at best unpersuasive.
Part II of this Article discusses Chisholm v. Georgia,4 suggesting
that the decision’s content and mode of analysis undercut the Alden
Court’s characterization of it. Part III discusses the different interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, suggesting that the Court’s
interpretation is one of the least plausible and ill-founded of those
that have been offered. Part IV discusses the Framers’ intentions,
suggesting that the Court’s current jurisprudence contradicts any
plausible interpretation of either the Framers’ views or of the arguments they made to convince others to ratify the Constitution. The
Article concludes that the current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence articulated by the Court is more consonant with the status of
the states under the Articles of Confederation than under the Constitution and that the understanding of the relationship between the
federal and state governments currently favored by the Court is precisely what the Framers were attempting to displace when arguing
for the ratification of the Constitution.
II. THE CHISHOLM DECISION
The current federalism controversy dividing the Court can best
be understood after a discussion of Chisholm and the nation’s reaction to that decision. Chisholm’s holding, that states were subject to
suits by citizens of other states, 5 was so unpopular6 that it was
quickly overruled 7 by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitu-

4. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
5. The opinions of the Justices, in a four-to-one decision, were rendered seriatim. See
id. at 429. Chief Justice Jay held with the majority, see id. at 476, 479, as did Justice Blair,
see id. at 451, Justice Wilson, see id. at 463, and Justice Cushing, see id. at 469. Justice Iredell was the sole dissenter. See id. at 430.
6. See e.g., RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 326 (1969) (discussing “the passions aroused by the Chisholm decision”); James E. Pfander, History and State
Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1269, 1278 (1998) (“The Chisholm decision does appear to have fallen upon the country
with a profound shock . . . .”). But see John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM . L. REV . 1413, 1440 (1975) (“[A]t least some Federalists reacted positively to Chisholm immediately following the decision . . . .”).
7. Chisholm was decided in 1793, see Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 429, and the Eleventh
Amendment was proposed to the state legislatures by the Third Congress on September 5,
1794. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lvi (5th ed. 1997). In a
message from the President to Congress on January 8, 1798, it was declared to have been
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. See id.
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tion. 8 Courts and commentators disagree about whether9 and why10
Chisholm was wrongly decided and even about the content of the
Chisholm dissent. 11 An examination of the different issues discussed
in Chisholm will help illustrate why the Court’s current federalism
position neither captures the historical views of the Constitution’s
Framers nor promotes the interests of the nation as a whole.
A. Doing Justice
In Chisholm, the state of Georgia was sued by a citizen of South
Carolina.12 The state refused to appear in court, contending that it
could not be sued by the plaintiff because it had sovereign immunity.13 The Court disagreed,14 pointing to the specific provisions in the
8. See Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1983) (“The Amendment’s language overruled the particular result in Chisholm.”); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 431 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the “prompt passage of the Eleventh
Amendment nullifying the decision in [Chisholm v. Georgia]”); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 45
(1988) (“Chisholm v. Georgia . . . provoked enactment of the amendment . . . .”); James E.
Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82
CAL. L. REV . 555, 651 (1994) (“Everyone appears to agree that the Eleventh Amendment
was passed in response to Chisholm.”); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1696 (1997) (“Most scholars agree . . . that the
Amendment’s purpose was to reverse Chisholm.”).
9. See e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999) (“It might be argued that the
Chisholm decision was a correct interpretation of the constitutional design and that the
Eleventh Amendment represented a deviation from the original understanding. This, however, seems unsupportable.”). But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“I am of opinion that the decision in [Chisholm] was based upon a sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was.”).
10. See e.g., William Burnham, Taming the Eleventh Amendment Without Overruling
Hans v. Louisiana, 40 CASE W. RES . L. R EV . 931, 936 (1989/1990). Burnham states:
According to the common law immunity theorists, the sin of the Chisholm majority was that it incorrectly mixed two questions: (1) whether the Court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the case under article III and its implementing
statutes, and (2) whether an assumpsit cause of action for the state’s breach of
contract existed in the face of Georgia’s defense of sovereign immunity.
Id.; Vazquez, supra note 8, at 1696 (“[S]cholars stress that Chisholm was an action in assumpsit involving an ordinary commercial dispute between an individual and a state. They
argue that the Eleventh Amendment merely reversed the Chisholm Court’s holding that
the states could be sued in federal court by individuals on nonfederal causes of action.”).
11. Compare, for example, Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (suggesting that the dissent argued
that a sovereign state could not be sued without its consent) with Alden, 527 U.S. at 787
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the core of the dissent as that “the Court could not assume a waiver of the State’s common-law sovereign immunity where Congress had not expressly passed such a waiver”).
12. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 420 (reporting the U.S. Attorney General’s motion on behalf of Georgia, which described the parties); see also Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways
and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484 (1987) (“Chisholm was an original action in assumpsit, filed by the South Carolina executor of a South Carolina estate, to recover money owed
to the estate by Georgia.”).
13. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 469 (Jay, C.J.) (“It is said, that Georgia refuses to appear
and answer to the Plaintiff in this action, because she is a sovereign State, and therefore
not liable to such actions.”).
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Constitution specifying that the Court would have jurisdiction in
cases involving states as parties, 15 and holding that if the state refused to appear in court before the beginning of the next term either
to present its case or to establish why it did not need to do so, it
would be subject to a default judgment.16
Chisholm implicated a number of different issues: whether states
could ever be sued without their consent17 and, if so, under what conditions; 18 whether, and to what extent, states had surrendered their
sovereign immunity when becoming part of the Union;19 and, among
other issues, what kind of sovereign immunity, if any, was enjoyed by
the states once they became part of the Union.20 Chisholm did not
answer these questions directly, although the different positions articulated by the Justices made clear that sovereign immunity was
not the bulwark against suits that some had believed.
Chisholm was a case in assumpsit21 in which the plaintiff was suing the state of Georgia for money damages, 22 and one issue was
whether states were subject to those kinds of suits in particular. 23
14. See id. at 480 (Jay, C.J.) (“Ordered, that unless the said State shall either in due
form appear, or show cause to the contrary in this Court, by the first day of next Term,
judgment by default shall be entered against the said State.”); see also Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974) (noting that the Chisholm decision allowed a state to be sued by a
citizen of another state).
15. See id. 450 (Blair, J.) (“What then do we find there [in the Constitution] requiring
the submission of individual States to the judicial authority of the United States? This is
expressly extended, among other things, to controversies between a State and citizens of
another State.”).
16. See id. at 480 (Jay, C.J.); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (implying that it was important to focus on
the “particular question (abstracted from the general one, viz. Whether, a State can in any
instance be sued?)”).
18. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting) (pointing out that “in England, certain judicial
proceedings, not inconsistent with the sovereignty, may take place against the Crown, but
that an action of assumpsit will not lie”).
19. See id. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“Every State in the Union, in every instance
where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered.”); id. at
457 (Wilson, J.) (“As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is not a sovereign
State. If the judicial decision of this case forms one of those purposes; the allegation, that
Georgia is a sovereign State, is unsupported by the fact.”); id. at 468 (Cushing, J.) (“Whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people, for their own necessary security, is
so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of states.”).
20. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV . 515, 540 (1977) (discussing whether the sovereign
immunity enjoyed by the states is of common law versus constitutional dimension).
21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 122 (6th ed. 1990) (“A common law form of action
which lies for the recovery of damages for the non-performance of a parol or simple contract; or a contract that is neither of record nor under seal.”).
22. See Vazquez, supra note 8, at 1696 (1997) (pointing out that some “scholars stress
that Chisholm was an action in assumpsit involving an ordinary commercial dispute between an individual and a state”).
23. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469 (Jay, C.J.) (“A second question made in the
case was, whether the particular action of assumpsit could lie against a State?”).
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Justice Iredell pointed out in his Chisholm dissent that in “England,
certain judicial proceedings not inconsistent with the sovereignty,
may take place against the Crown, but . . . an action of assumpsit will
not lie.”24 However, other members of the Court believed that an action in assumpsit would be paradigmatic of the type of action that
might be brought against a state by a citizen of another state. For
example, Justice Cushing suggested that “assumpsit will lie, if any
suit; provided a State is capable of contracting.”25 Thus, Alden claims
to the contrary notwithstanding,26 the disagreement between the
members of the Chisholm Court was not about whether a nonconsenting state could ever be sued but instead about whether such a
state could be subjected to an action in assumpsit. 27
Certainly, Justice Cushing’s position that an action in assumpsit
must lie was not the only reasonable position that might have been
offered. It could have been suggested that states would be subject to
suit if, for example, a federal claim were at issue28 but not if a mere
24. Id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting). But see id. at 458 (Wilson, J.) (suggesting that
the British position “is only a branch of a much more extensive principle, on which a plan
of systematic despotism has been lately formed in England, and prosecuted with unwearied assiduity and care” and that the system in the United States is rather different). Justice Wilson stated that “all human law must be prescribed by a superior,” but he also
stated:
[A]nother principle, very different in its nature and operations forms . . . the
basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of
equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience they require. The Sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in
the man.
Id.
25. Id. at 469 (Cushing, J.).
26. The Alden Court implied that Justice Iredell was claiming that states could not be
sued without their consent. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“[T]he doctrine
that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when
the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”). However, Justice Iredell was in fact suggesting that because Congress had not authorized the Court to hear the suit in question, common law practices dictated whether the suit was permissible. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 43547 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (discussing various acts of Congress and relevant common law
practices). Justice Iredell explained that the only remedy against one’s own sovereign at
English common law was the petition of right: “[O]f whatever nature is the demand, . . .
there must be some indorsement or order of the King himself to warrant any further proceedings. The remedy, . . . being a matter of grace, and not on compulsion.” Id. at 444 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
27. See John V. Orth, The Truth about Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), Lecture delivered at North Carolina School of Law (Apr. 14, 1994), in 73 N.C. L.
REV . 255, 263 (1994). Orth stated:
With a care that could be mistaken for pedantry, Justice Iredell framed the
question: ‘Will an action of assumpsit lie against a State?’—by which he meant
literally to confine the case to the narrow question of whether a state could be
sued in that particular form of action, not whether a state could be sued generally.
Id. (footnote omitted).
28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”).
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contract claim were involved.29 However, rejecting that states would
be liable for breach of contract claims 30 would have some unwelcome
implications, since a state might then enter into a contract, refuse to
pay what was owed, and the other contracting party would have to
bear the loss because no court could hear the cause of action. 31 In the
words of Chief Justice Jay, “The exception contended for, would contradict and do violence to the great and leading principles of a free
and equal national government, one of the great objects of which is,
to ensure justice to all . . . .”32
Justice Wilson argued that states, like ordinary citizens, should
not be permitted to avoid responsibility for their actions. He suggested that a dishonest merchant who had made and willfully refused to discharge a contract would be “amenable to a Court of Justice.”33 He then asked rhetorically whether a state that had made and
willfully refused to discharge a contract should, “when summoned to
answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to
assume a new appearance, and to insult . . . justice, by declaring I am
a SOVEREIGN State?” 34 Thus, because an individual could not make
a contract, willfully refuse to discharge it, and nonetheless be immune from liability, a state should not be able to do so either.
Arguably, one of the purposes of the Constitution is “to establish
justice,”35 and it would be unjust to permit states to refuse to honor
their agreements. Suppose, however, that a state had a good reason
to justify its refusal to pay and was acting justly in so refusing. Even
so, the reason for refusal would go to the merits of the case and
should not preclude the Court from hearing argument.
Two additional points should be made about Justice Wilson’s argument. First, although he was suggesting that the Court had a duty
to see that justice was done, he was not suggesting that the Court
29. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HARV . L. REV . 1, 21-22 (1963) (discussing “Chisholm v. Georgia, where a state sought
perhaps to avoid its contract, [or] possibly to defy the contract clause, but not to defy the
national government”); see also Jackson, supra note 8, at 45 (pointing out that Chisholm
“was a state law claim, presenting no substantive federal issues”).
30. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law , 74 VA. L. REV .
1141, 1192 (1988) (mentioning “the breach of contract action in Chisholm”).
31. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (“What good
purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, if a State might pass a law impairing
the obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling judiciary power?”). Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on
Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 1133, 1143 (2000) (“To put it
less delicately, the Union was composed of would-be deadbeats who wished to maintain the
option of defaulting on their debts.”).
32. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 477 (Jay, C.J.).
33. Id. at 456 (Wilson, J.).
34. Id. (Wilson, J.).
35. Id. at 465 (Wilson, J.); U.S. CONST., Preamble (“We the People of the United
States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice . . . .”).
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could hear any case in which a state failed to live up to its commitments. He, like the other Justices, tied the Court’s basis for jurisdiction to the fact that Chisholm involved a controversy between one
state and the citizen of another.36 Had a Georgia citizen brought the
suit against his own state in Chisholm, the Court would not have had
jurisdiction even if the alleged injustice had been no less significant. 37
Second, while Justice Wilson’s analysis is not without merit, it may
be less persuasive than it first appears. Arguably, even assuming
that no there were no extenuating circumstances justifying a merchant’s or a state’s refusal to pay, the cases would nonetheless be
dissimilar in one important respect. Justice Iredell suggested that
the cases were not comparable, precisely because of the different understandings regarding recourse for nonpayment that would have existed at the time the original agreements would have been made.38
He pointed out that everyone “must know that no suit can lie against
a Legislative body.”39 Anyone contracting with the state must hope
that the “Legislature on principles of public duty, will make a provision for the execution of their own contracts . . . .”40 If the legislature
does not, however, “the case is certainly without remedy in any of the
Courts of the State.”41 Thus, Justice Iredell suggested, the would-be
creditor would know prospectively that there would be no other recourse if the legislature could not be convinced to pay the debt.
Justice Iredell was not suggesting that the legislature would be
blameless for failing to fulfill the contract, since he discussed the “reproach the Legislature may incur.”42 However, he was suggesting
that the courts could provide no remedy and, further, that everyone
would be aware that no such recourse would be available when they
had originally contracted with the state. Thus, the cases are readily
distinguishable because prospectively there would be no expectation
that a state could be brought to court for having failed to pay a debt,
but there would be such an expectation regarding a merchant who
had failed to do so. The cases differ not in whether the creditor

36. See infra notes 67 and 70 and accompanying text.
37. The Justices never stated as much outright. Instead, they discussed the Court’s
jurisdiction relative to suits by a citizen against another state, a state against another
state, foreign states against a state, and suits where the United States would be a party.
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution established federal jurisdiction over all of these,
but did not provide for suits by a citizen against his own state. See U.S. C ONST . art. III, § 2,
cl. 1. Thus, because there would be neither diversity jurisdiction nor federal question jurisdiction, the Court could not have heard such a case. See, e.g., Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S.
608, 618 (1893) (“The jurisdiction of the Federal courts is a limited one, depending upon either the existence of a Federal question or diverse citizenship of the parties.”).
38. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 445 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 446.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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should be paid, or even in whether it would be unjust not to make the
payment, but in the avenues that might be pursued in the event of
nonpayment.
B. Becoming Part of the Union
Whether a state is subject to suit for an action in assumpsit depends, at least in part, upon whether states should be characterized
as sovereigns in their own right or whether, instead, they are more
akin to other non-natural persons like corporations, which would be
subject to such a suit. 43 Which characterization is proper depends
upon what the states gave up to become part of the United States, for
example, whether by entering the Union, Georgia implicitly or explicitly agreed to be subject to such suits. 44
Justice Iredell did not address what the states had implicitly surrendered by becoming members of the United States. Instead, he focused on the conditions under which the Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction to hear the case before it. He reasoned that if the Court
could hear such an action against a state, “it must be in virtue of the
Constitution of the United States, and of some law of Congress conformable thereto.”45 He thus suggested that a two-part inquiry would
be necessary to determine whether the Court would have jurisdiction
to hear such a case: (1) whether the Constitution even permitted
nonconsented-to suits against states for money damages, and (2)
whether, even if constitutionally permitted, Congress had in addition
granted the Court jurisdiction over such a suit. While suggesting
that the answer to (1) was “[n]o,”46 Justice Iredell made clear that his
43. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) (pointing out that sovereign
immunity does not extend to municipal corporations). But cf. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
448 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between states and corporations).
44. Justice Iredell stated that “[e]very State in the Union in every instance where its
sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as completely so vereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered.” Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Justice Blair’s approach differed slightly:
The Constitution of the United States is the only fountain from which I shall
draw; the only authority to which I shall appeal. Whatever be the true language of that, it is obligatory upon every member of the Union; for, no State
could have become a member, but by an adoption of it by the people of that
State.
Id. at 450. Chief Justice Jay made clear that the relevant issue was “whether Georgia has
not, by being a party to the national compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens
of another State.” Id. at 473.
45. Id. at 430 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 449 (“So much, however, has been said on the constitution, that it may
not be improper to intimate, that my present opinion is strongly against any construction
of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a state for the
recovery of money.”). Justice Blair did not agree:
It is, however, a sufficient answer to say, that our constitution most certainly
contemplates, in another branch of the cases enumerated, the maintaining a
jurisdiction against a state, as defendant; this is unequivocally asserted when
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dissent was not predicated on that position,47 but on Congress’s not
having authorized the Court to hear such a suit. 48
The Constitution specifies that the “Judicial Power shall extend to
. . . Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another
State,”49 and, at least arguably, permits such suits. 50 However, Justice Iredell argued that the Court’s jurisdiction was subject to the
dictates of Congress51 and that the necessary congressional authorization was lacking.52 Not only had Congress not specifically authorized the Court to hear suits against the states for money damages,
but it had specified that the Court was limited in that the exercise of
its jurisdiction must be “agreeable to the principles and usages of
law.”53
Justice Iredell pointed out that no state had a law “authorizing a
compulsory suit for the recovery of money against a State . . . either
when the Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act
was passed.”54 Thus, because the Court’s jurisdiction was based on
whatever was agreeable to the principles and usages of law, and because no state had yet passed the relevant legislation at the time the
Judiciary Act of 178955 was passed, Justice Iredell argued that the
Court’s jurisdiction could not be grounded in the principles and usages of law as reflected in the then-existing statutes. He referred to
the laws of the time, not to establish that the state would have sovereign immunity even if Congress had specifically granted the Court
the judicial power of the United States is extended to controversies between
two or more States . . . .
Id. at 451 (Blair, J.).
47. See id. at 450 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“This opinion I hold, however, with all the
reserve proper for one, which, according to my sentiments in this case, may be deemed in
some measure extra-judicial.”); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 787 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“Justice Iredell added, in what he clearly identified as dictum, that he was ‘strongly
against’ any construction of the Constitution ‘which will admit, under any circumstances, a
compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money’ . . . .”).
48. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
50. See Chisholm, 2 U.S.(2 Dall.) at 450 (Blair, J.) (noting that the Constitution expressly includes controversies between a state and citizens of another state within the
Court’s jurisdiction).
51. See id. at 432 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“I conceive, that all the Courts of the United
States must receive, not merely their organization as to the number of Judges of which
they are to consist; but all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the
Legislature only.”).
52. See New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. 284, 289 (1831) (“Mr. Justice Iredell thought
an act of congress necessary to enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction.”).
Justice Iredell was the only Member of the Court to hold that the suit could not
lie; but if his discussion was far-reaching, his reasoning was cautious. Its core
was that the Court could not assume a waiver of the State’s commonlaw sovereign immunity where Congress had not expressly passed such a waiver.
Alden, 527 U.S. at 787 (Souter, J., dissenting).
53. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 434-35 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
55. 1 STAT. 73.
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jurisdiction over the action at issue (as one might have inferred from
reading the Alden interpretation of Justice Iredell’s dissent),56 but as
a kind of default reference precisely because Congress had not specifically authorized the Court to hear a suit like the one at issue in
Chisholm.57
Even if not reflected in existing statutory law, however, the principles and usages of the common law might be thought to have provided the basis for the Chisholm Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.
To determine whether that was so, it was necessary to examine
whether, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, “an action . . . like
this before the Court could have been maintained against one of the
States in the Union upon the principles of the common law . . . .”58
Justice Iredell concluded that such a case could not have been maintained at common law prior to the Constitution’s adoption and thus
could not be maintained even after its adoption, precisely because
there had been no congressional or statutory authorization that
would have superseded the common law.59
When stating that the Court could only exercise jurisdiction if doing so would be in accord with the principles and usages of law, Congress might have meant that the principles and usages of law at the
time the Judiciary Act was passed would be the relevant criterion, 60
or that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction would have to be in accord
with the principles and usages of law at the time the jurisdiction was
challenged.61 That difference could be important, since the principles
and usages might have changed in the intervening years. For example, between the time that the Judiciary Act was passed and the time
that Chisholm was decided, an act had been passed in Georgia that
would have allowed suits against the state.62 A separate issue is
whether a change in state law should have any import for whether
56. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
57. Or, precisely because Congress had specifically authorized the Court to hear the
action, if doing so was in accord with the existing practices and usages of law.
58. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also Jaffe, supra note 29, at 20
(“Justice Iredell, dissenting, argued that in exercising its jurisdiction under the Constitution, the Court must look to the common law . . . .”).
59. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434-35 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
60. See Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166, 190 (1867) (“Usages of law . . .
are the words of the provision, which, doubtless, refers to the principles and usages of law
as known and understood in the State courts at the date of that enactment.”).
61. But see id. at 191, where the Court in Riggs stated:
Adopted as [writs, executions, and the modes of process] were, by an act of
Congress, they became the permanent forms and modes of proceeding, and continue in force wholly unaffected by any subsequent State legislation. Alterations can only be made by Congress, or by the Federal courts, acting under the
authority of an act of Congress.
62. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“Since that time an
act of Assembly for such a purpose has been passed in Georgia. But that surely could have
no influence in the construction of an act of the Legislature of the United States passed before [it].”).
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federal jurisdiction can be asserted. 63 However, this issue was not
addressed by the Chisholm Court. Indeed, the majority and dissent
addressed very different issues.
Justice Iredell framed the issues narrowly—had Congress authorized the Court to hear an action in assumpsit?—to provide a way for
the Court to avoid what would likely be a very unpopular decision. 64
The other Justices did not address whether the principles and usages
of law were fixed at the time the Judiciary Act was adopted or instead should be thought to evolve through time. Rather, they focused
on the language in the Constitution specifying the Court’s jurisdiction. For example, Justice Blair pointed out that the Constitution
“gives to the Supreme Court original jurisdiction, among other instances, in the case where a State shall be a party,”65 and then asked
rhetorically: “[B]ut is not a State a party as well in the condition of a
Defendant, as in that of a Plaintiff?” 66
Each of the Justices in the majority framed the issue as whether
the state had general immunity from suit as a defendant,67 although
Chief Justice Jay’s analysis of sovereign immunity had an additional
component. First, he addressed “whether suability is compatible with
State sovereignty”68 as a general matter. Like the other Justices, he
pointed out that “any one State in the Union may sue another State,
in this Court,”69 and then concluded that “suability and state sovereignty are not incompatible.”70
63. See id. (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“But [the passing of the act] surely could have no
influence in the construction of an act of the Legislature of the United States passed before.”). For a similar view, see Riggs, 73 U.S. at 191 (discussing the irrelevance of subsequent state action to whether federal courts would have jurisdiction).
64. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999). (“[E]ven a casual reading of the
opinions suggests the majority suspected the decision would be unpopular and surprising.”); see also Orth, supra note 27, at 267 (noting “th e risks the Court ran by deciding
against Georgia (or any other recalcitrant state)”).
65. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451 (Blair, J.); see also Pfander, supra note 8, at 588
(suggesting that the “grant of Supreme Court original jurisdiction effectuates . . . a waiver
[of immunity by the states]”).
66. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 451 (Blair, J.).
67. Justice Blair pointed out that the Constitution “contemplates . . . the maintaining
a jurisdiction against a state, as defendant; this is unequivocally asserted, when the judicial power of the United States is extended to controversies between two or more states.”
Id. at 451 (Blair, J.). Justice Wilson asked rhetorically whether the “most consummate degree of professional ingenuity [could] devise a mode by which this ‘controversy between two
States’ [could] be brought before a court of law; and yet neither of those states be a defendant.” Id. at 466 (Wilson, J.). Justice Cushing rejected the suggestion that the Constitution
“could not be intended to subject a state to be a defendant, because it would effect the so vereignty of states,” by pointing out that in “‘controversies between two or more States,’ . . .
a state must of necessity be defendant.” Id. at 467 (Cushing, J.).
68. Id. at 472 (Jay, C.J.).
69. Id. at 473.
70. Id. The Cohens Court suggested that the amendment was not designed “to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the nation,” since the amendment “does not comprehend
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Chief Justice Jay understood that even if states are suable by
other states, it might nonetheless be argued that “the State is not
bound to appear and answer as a Defendant, at the suit of an individual.”71 However, he pointed out: “That rule is said to be a bad one,
which does not work both ways; the citizens of Georgia are content
with a right of suing citizens of other States; but are not content that
citizens of other States should have a right to sue them.”72 This latter
argument—that fairness requires that those capable of suing should
be subject to suit, and vice versa, was addressed and implicitly supported by John Marshall in the Virginia debates concerning whether
the Constitution should be ratified. 73 When holding that sovereignty
was compatible with being sued by individuals, the Chisholm Court
did not distinguish between federal and nonfederal causes of action—
it suggested that a citizen of another state might bring either kind of
action. Arguably, that was a mistake,74 and the failure to so distinguish caused the Court to misrepresent (at least some of) the Framers’ intentions. 75
The issue before the Chisholm Court was whether the Court had
jurisdiction to hear an action in assumpsit. A separate issue involved
whether the debt was enforceable even if it had been contracted before the Constitution had been ratified. Even if a state were suable
for debts contracted after it had become part of the United States,
controversies between two or more States, or between a State and a foreign State.” Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821).
71. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 473 (Jay, C.J.).
72. Id.
73. See infra notes 217-230 and accompanying text. The only way to make sense of
Marshall’s comments is to ascribe this view to him, although the transcribed comments do
not say this literally. The point here is not that fairness is the only, or even the weightiest,
consideration when assessing whether states should have sovereign immunity in these
matters, but merely that this at the very least, is an argument that Marshall thought sufficiently compelling that it needed to be addressed.
74. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 599 (suggesting, contrary to the majority in Chisholm, that states’ immunity was waived on federal questions but that the states’ common
law immunity had to be respected on nonfederal questions); see also Martha A. Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition
of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV . 1203, 1210 (1978) (arguing for federal question
jurisdiction: “There is no place for a sovereign immunity claim in a suit by a state’s own
citizens when Congress, acting within its regulatory powers, has authorized the suit; by
ratifying the Constitution, with its grants of power to Congress, the state consented to
such suits.”). William Burnham made a similar argument:
The Chisholm Court should have separated the issues and decided that it had
jurisdiction under article III, but that such a grant of jurisdiction did nothing to
affect the law to be applied in the case. The substantive law, which governed
both the plaintiff’s claim and Georgia’s defense, was the general common law,
which provided that an assumpsit claim would not lie against a state in the absence of its consent to suit.
Burnham, supra note 10, at 936.
75. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 561 (suggesting that the Framers’ intent was that
they would lose their immunity with respect to federal causes of action but not for nonfederal causes of action).
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that would not mean that it would also be suable for debts acquired
before becoming part of the Union. Chief Justice Jay made quite
clear that the Chisholm Court was not deciding whether, for example, an individual could “sue a State on bills of credit issued before
the Constitution was established, and which were issued and received on the faith of the State, and at a time when no ideas or expectations of judicial interposition were entertained or contemplated.”76 Nonetheless, the very possibility that states would be responsible for such debts provided great impetus to amend the Constitution to overrule Chisholm.
III. THE PASSAGE OF THE E LEVENTH AMENDMENT
Courts and commentators agree that the Eleventh Amendment
was designed to overrule Chisholm and that a major impetus for its
passage was that judicial enforcement of debts acquired prior to and
during the war would impose potentially crushing burdens on the
states. 77 However, there is agreement about little else, except perhaps that current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is something
of a “doctrinal mess,”78 and the unresolved issues are not only dividing the Court, but have significant implications for what kind of
country the United States is and will become.
A. The Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”79 The language of the Amendment seems rather straightforward and to require relatively little interpretation. 80 Appearances
notwithstanding, however, it is not immediately clear how to construe the Amendment, and current commentators not only engage in

76. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 479 (Jay, C.J.).
77. See infra notes 99-124.
78. James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal
Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV.
161, 167 (1998).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
80. See Gene R. Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L.J. 601, 609
(1989). Shreve wrote:
The manner in which the eleventh amendment deals with state immunity may
be arbitrary, but the text is no less clear for that. It does not protect states from
suit by their own citizens. It applies without reference to the remedy sought. It
restricts all of the judicial power, not merely that exercised under diversity jurisdiction.
Id.
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extratextual analysis, 81 but also seem to ignore or radically alter the
text. 82
There is general agreement that the Eleventh Amendment precludes a suit like Chisholm, although that might be for a number of
different reasons. For example, the only reason that the Court had
jurisdiction to hear Chisholm was because the Constitution says that
the federal judicial power shall extend to controversies “between a
State and Citizens of another State.”83 If the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment was merely to overrule Chisholm, then the Amendment
(1) would make clear that Chisholm was wrongly decided or, at any
rate, that the Constitution would no longer permit suits like Chisholm to be heard in federal court, and (2) would not change anything
else in the Constitution. As the Alden Court recognized, “[b]y its
terms, . . . the Eleventh Amendment did not redefine the federal judicial power but instead overruled the Court,”84 and thus even the
Alden Court should be sympathetic to the suggestion that Chisholm
should be read narrowly.
Someone tempted to interpret the Eleventh Amendment as
merely overturning Chisholm—as only precluding diversity jurisdiction in federal court where a state is one of the parties 85—might seem
to have an insurmountable hurdle. The Eleventh Amendment appears not merely to preclude diversity jurisdiction where a state is a
party, but it precludes any federal jurisdiction where a state is a
party and a citizen or subject of a foreign state is the other party.
Thus, the Amendment’s language suggests that no suit in law or equity may be brought by a foreign citizen,86 and the claim that the
81. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARV . L. REV . 1342, 1347 (1989) (discussing Professor William Marshall’s claim that diversity theorists must also engage in substantial extratextual analysis).
82. Cf. id. at 1345 (suggesting that it is “difficult to think of any other facet of the
Constitution with respect to which the Court has reached results so obviously inconsistent
with the words used by the framers”). The same might be said of the other interpretations.
83. U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In fact, all of the Justices in the Chisholm majority
pointed to this provision to justify the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. See supra notes
67-70 and accompanying text.
84. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722 (1999).
85. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM . L. REV . 1889, 1894 (1983) (“The amendment did nothing more
than amend article III, section 2 of the Constitution to eliminate the power of federal
courts to hear suits against states in which the sole basis for jurisdiction was the status of
the parties.”); David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV . L. REV . 61, 68 (1984) (suggesting “that the eleventh amendment is
addressed only to the question of party identity as a basis of jurisdiction”); Vazquez, supra
note 8, at 1697 (“[D]iversity scholars agree that the Amendment should not be understood
to bar Congress from conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts over cases arising under
federal law but should instead be read to preclude only federal jurisdiction over suits
against states predicated solely on diversity.”).
86. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 484-85
(1987). The Court stated:
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Amendment was merely restoring the common law immunity to the
states would seem to be belied by the text. 87 An additional difficulty
posed by the text is that it only addresses suits between states and
foreign citizens. In other words, in reading the Amendment on its
face, a state’s own citizens are not precluded from suing their state in
federal court, even though the citizens of other states are so precluded.88 Some commentators have suggested that the Amendment
makes no sense precisely because it has this seemingly irrational feature.89
In Blatchford v. Noatak,90 the Court suggested that it understands
the “Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by
this sovereignty.”91 The Alden Court spoke approvingly of the Blatchford view92 and implied that the Blatchford understanding was reflected in the constitutional design.93 As the Alden Court explained,
although the Court sometimes refers to the “State’s immunity from
suit as ‘Eleventh Amendment immunity,’ [t]he phrase is convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity
of the States neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment.”94 Yet, if the Eleventh Amendment merely
confirms the original constitutional structure, it will be important to
understand the conditions under which state sovereign immunity
could be asserted within the original constitutional design. Once that
The dissent, observing that jurisdiction in Chisholm itself was based solely on
the fact that Chisholm was not a citizen of Georgia, argues that the Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to cases presenting a federal question. . . . Federalquestion actions unquestionably are suits “in law or equity”; thus the plain language of the Amendment refutes this argument.
Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 81, at 1347 (“[T]he diversity theory goes on completely to
ignore the operative words of the amendment, which provide that ‘[t]he judicial power
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity’ that meets the criteria set
forth in the amendment.”).
87. See Burnham, supra note 10, at 937 (“The eleventh amendment, then, by
restoring article III to its proper position of neutrality with regard to the common law, had
the effect of restoring to the states the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suit.”).
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
89. See Allen K. Easley, The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Amendment: Mourning
the Lost Opportunity to Synthesize Conflicting Precedents, 64 DENV . U. L. REV . 485, 487
(1988) (suggesting that the Amendment “makes no sense”).
90. 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
91. Id. at 779 (citing Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 472 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
92. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).
93. See id. at 710-11 (“[A]s the Constitution’s structure . . . make[s] clear, the State’s
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.”).
94. Id. at 710.
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is understood, Alden claims notwithstanding, it will be clearer why
the Amendment should be interpreted narrowly and why it is best
understood as merely precluding federal diversity jurisdiction when a
state and a foreign citizen are the parties.
B. Why Only Preclude Citizens of Other States and Countries
from Suing?
When the Chisholm decision was issued, it was greeted with “profound shock,”95 and the Eleventh Amendment was adopted soon
thereafter.96 However, it is important to establish what caused the
shock. It was not, for example, the idea that a state might be sued by
a mere citizen, since states had already adopted their own laws permitting such suits by the time Chisholm was issued97 and, in fact, as
Justice Iredell pointed out in his Chisholm dissent, Georgia permitted such suits. 98 Rather, it seems plausible to suggest that the shock
resulted from a consideration of who would benefit if such suits were
permitted—speculators99 who had bought state debts at a mere fraction of their face value,100 Tories/British sympathizers, 101 and the
95. Pfander, supra note 8, at 578 (discussing “the ‘profound shock’ school of Eleventh
Amendment thought”); see also Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483
U.S. 468, 484 (1987) (“The reaction to Chisholm was swift and hostile. The Eleventh
Amendment passed both Houses of Congress by large majorities in 1794.”); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (suggesting Chisholm “created such a shock of surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution was almost unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by
the legislatures of the States.”); Jaffe, supra note 29, at 20 (“Chisholm v. Georgia in the
words of Mr. Justice Bradley created ‘such a shock of surprise throughout the country that,
at the first meeting of Congress thereafter, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution
was almost unanimously proposed . . . .’”).
96. See Pfander, supra note 8, at 651 (“Everyone appears to agree that the Eleventh
Amendment was passed in response to Chisholm.”).
97. See id. at 580 (“Americans had substituted the sovereignty of the people for the
sovereignty of the crown and had secured limitations on governmental power through
adoption of written constitutions. Judge Gibbons notes that the charters of many American
colonies included provisions that authorized suit against the governing body.”).
98. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
99. See Marshall, supra note 81, at 1366 (“The class of out-of-state creditors appears
predominantly to have been the speculators whom many states had a strong aversion to
paying.”).
100. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 325 (“The citizenry was up in arms against taxation
that would only serve to enrich Tories and speculators who had bought State obligations
for a few cents on the dollar.”); CLYDE E. JACOBS , THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 33 (1972) (discussing the fear that Virginia “could be sued in federal
court by northern holders of depreciated currency, who had purchased the notes for a tiny
fraction of their face value”); Pfander, supra note 6, at 1282-83 (“[A]grarians saw full repayment of public debts as likely to impose a stiff tax burden on the yeomanry, and to
benefit the speculators and ‘bloodsuckers’ who had paid less than par for their public securities and who would reap profits from redemption at par.”).
101. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 326 (discussing “the bitter resentment against suits
by speculators and Loyalists”); see also Nowak, supra note 6, at 1440 (explaining that Federalists voted for the Amendment to show that they were against “Tory suits”). Further,
there might have been the separate worry that if Congress did not support an amendment,
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British themselves. 102 Thus, while at first blush it might seem
unlikely that an amendment would be adopted solely to ensure that
out-of-staters could not sue for debt collection,103 it becomes more understandable when one considers who in particular those individuals
might be—either out-of-state speculators104 or those whose sympathies lay with those against whom the Revolutionary War had recently been fought.
John Gibbons points out that at the beginning of the Revolutionary War, “American debtors, mostly southern planters, owed about
$28 million to British merchants,”105 and that none of that debt had
been paid by the end of 1782.106 The Peace Treaty of 1783 signed with
the British guaranteed both that debts would be paid in sterling,
rather than in paper money, and that British and Loyalist property
would receive increased protection.107 If these provisions could be enforced in federal court, many southerners stood to lose huge sums of
money.108 As if this were not enough reason for southern planters to
be upset about being forced to pay those against whom they had recently been at war, there was further reason, since the evacuating
British army had emancipated thousands of slaves, notwithstanding
an explicit treaty provision that they would do no such thing.109 The
southerners viewed themselves as doubly harmed by this British
army action because they not only had lost their “property,” but in
states might have called for a constitutional convention. See Marshall, supra note 81, at
1359 (“If Congress had not proposed an amendment to protect the states, the states might
have tried to invoke the alternative method for securing constitutional change—calling a
constitutional convention.”).
102. See JACOBS , supra note 100, at 70 (“[I]n Congress, as well as in the state legislatures, there was strong opposition to recognition of any liability to reimburse British creditors or to make restitution for the seizure of Loyalist property.”); Gibbons, supra note 85, at
1900 (“At the outset of the war, American debtors, mostly southern planters, owed about
$28 million to British merchants, an amount equal in value to two years’ worth of imports.”). Further, the expectation that such suits would be brought was not unreasonable.
See Marshall, supra note 81, at 1357 (“The fear that the decision in Chisholm would give
rise to loyalists and British creditors bringing suits in federal court was far from speculative.”).
103. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1357 (“Yet it is doubtful that the framers would have
drafted an amendment to deal with so modest a threat to the state treasuries as that posed
by out-of-state plaintiffs.”).
104. See JACOBS , supra note 100, at 24 (stating that the “holders of state obligations
were concentrated in a few states”); Marshall, supra note 81, at 1365 (“[I]t appears that a
large portion of the state debt was held by out-of-staters. Specifically, southern states’ debt
was held by northern merchants.”); id. at 1366 (“The class of out-of-state creditors appears
predominantly to have been the speculators whom many states had a strong aversion to
paying. The class of in-state creditors, on the other hand, was a mixed bag and included
many original holders of the debt.”).
105. Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1900.
106. See id. at 1901.
107. See id. at 1900-01.
108. See id. at 1900 (suggesting that the debt amounted to about two and a half years
worth of imports).
109. See id. at 1900-01.
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addition, a source of inexpensive labor whereby they might have been
able to earn money to pay their debts. 110
When the ratification debates were taking place, it was widely
known that not all of the Southern states were complying with the
Peace Treaty with Great Britain.111 The issue of honoring that treaty
was itself a burning issue during the ratification debates, 112 and ratification of the Constitution (unless amended) might have required
treaty compliance. For this reason, changes in the language of the
Constitution were proposed; for example, there was a proposal that
federal courts would have no jurisdiction over treaty-based causes of
action that originated before the ratification of the Constitution.113
The failure of some states to honor the provisions of the treaty
gave Great Britain an excuse not to honor some of its provisions, for
example, to cease occupying forts that the British had promised to
abandon.114 Without credible assurances that Southern states would
honor the Treaty, the British had no incentive to fulfill their part of
the bargain. Many believed that it was essential that the treaty provisions be honored—indeed, John Gibbons discussed a “pervasive belief that the fate of the nation . . . hinge[d] on its ability to enforce the
1783 treaty.”115 Nonetheless, many southerners were not anxious to
pay debts to the British, especially without receiving compensation
for their losses. 116
Given the context in which the Eleventh Amendment was passed,
it does not seem surprising that the Amendment does not preclude a
citizen from suing her own state in federal court117 but only precludes
citizens from other states or countries from doing so, 118 commentators
110. See id. at 1918 (discussing Jefferson’s claim that “by carrying off so many slaves,
Great Britain had impoverished the planters and left them in no position to pay”).
111. See id. at 1906 (discussing the general knowledge of “Virginia’s ongoing violations
of the peace treaty”).
112. See id. at 1907 (mentioning the “burning issue of the power of British creditors to
redress their claims under the treaty in court”).
113. See id. at 1906 (discussing George Mason’s suggestion).
114. See id. at 1900.
115. Id. at 1902.
116. See id. at 1923.
Justice Iredell . . . was more sensitive than any of his colleagues to the depth of
southern antagonism aroused by the thought that debts dating from 1774 and
earlier would have to be paid with interest, and land titles disturbed, while no
one would be compensated for the loss of slaves carried off in 1783.
Id.
117. The Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes citizens from suing
their own states, although not because of anything in the text. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 662-63 (1973) (“While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a
State by its own citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of
another State.”); see also Field, supra note 20 (discussing “the extension [of the Eleventh
Amendment] to suits by a state’s own citizens”).
118. See William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV . L. REV . 1372, 1378 (1989) (“While the wording of the
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claims to the contrary notwithstanding.119 A possible implication of
Chisholm had been that foreign creditors would be able to sue in federal court to have their debts paid in sterling, but the Eleventh
Amendment removed that possibility.
The Eleventh Amendment did not need to address the ability of
in-staters to sue in federal court because there would have been no
diversity jurisdiction to allow in-stater suits in federal court to force
the states to pay their contract debts. Not only would in-staters have
been less likely to have been speculators, but such citizens, if permitted to sue at all, would have been suing in state court. Thus, although the fact that the Constitution did not preclude in-staters from
suing might have induced out-of-staters to sell the debts they owned
to in-staters, 120 the in-staters would either have been precluded from
suing because of common law sovereign immunity,121 or, in any event,
would be suing in state court where the court would be more likely to
uphold122 a state law requiring payment in paper money123 or in notes
that were virtually worthless because of inflation.124
The Court explained in Cohens v. Virginia125 that “at the adoption
of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal
Courts, formed a very serious objection to [the Constitution].”126
When the Chisholm Court held that it had jurisdiction over the case
at issue, the “alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions
that were so extensively entertained, [the Eleventh] amendment was
proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State legislatures.”127
It may well be that states did not expect that those obligations incurred before becoming members of the United States would have to
be met, especially not at face value or in sterling,128 and thus that
amendment purportedly prohibits all suits, including federal claims, brought against
states by out-of-staters, it does not prohibit federal claims brought by in -staters.”).
119. See Easley, supra note 89, at 487-88.
120. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1358 (noting that “a constitutional amendment that
barred disfavored plaintiffs from bringing federal claims but permitted eligible in-state
plaintiffs to do so would have invited the sale of notes, indents, and certificates from (ineligible) out-of-staters to (eligible) in-staters”).
121. See id.
122. Cf. Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1922 (discussing a defense against foreign creditors
that would likely be upheld by state courts).
123. See id. at 1901 (discussing paper-money legal tender laws).
124. See id. at 1911.
125. 19 U.S.(6 Wheat) 264 (1821).
126. Id. at 406.
127. Id.; see also, Jackson, supra note 8, at 23 (“Motivated by a fear that pre-existing
debts would be enforced by out-of-state creditors, the amendment was, in Marshall’s view,
narrowly drafted to extend only to those suits commenced by ‘persons who might probably
be its creditors.’“) (quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 406).
128. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1278 (“Chisholm was shocking . . . less because it
contemplated the suability of the states as corporate bodies than because it threatened to
require the states to honor old obligations to individual suitors in specie.”); see also id. at
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Chisholm was contrary to the expectations of the time. However, its
being contrary to some expectations or understandings does not establish that it was incorrect and certainly does not establish that
there was a general understanding that the states had constitutional
immunity from suit.
The Alden Court considered and rejected the idea that “the Chisholm decision was a correct interpretation of the constitutional design and that the Eleventh Amendment represented a deviation from
the original understanding.”129 The Alden Court gave two reasons: (1)
The Chisholm majority allegedly “failed to address either the practice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the time the
Constitution was adopted,” and (2) the “majority suspected the decision would be unpopular and surprising.”130 Yet, as Justice Iredell
made clear in his dissent, the first failing was significant only because Congress had not specifically granted the federal courts jurisdiction over cases like Chisholm,131 and the latter “failing” may speak
as much to the Court’s willingness to make difficult decisions as to
anything else.132
Even if Chisholm in fact “shocked the Nation,”133 it is important to
know whether that shock was due to an undermining of existing notions of sovereign immunity 134 or, instead, to the expectation that
out-of-state creditors would now unfairly benefit because, for example, the debts incurred before states joined the Union were not even
thought to be enforceable or because the speculators would receive
exorbitant windfalls if paid in specie. 135 One interpretation of the

1286-87 (describing various states that required creditors to accept paper money as legal
tender).
129. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720 (1999).
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
132. Cf. Alden, 527 U.S. at 790 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is a remarkable doctrine
that would hold anticipation of unpopularity the benchmark of constitutional error.”).
133. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1973).
134. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 505 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The majority of the delegates who spoke at the Virginia Convention, including Mason, Henry, Pendleton, and Randolph, did not believe that state sovereign immunity provided protection against suits initiated by citizens of other States.”);
Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1899 (“[E]vidence of a contemporaneous belief in state sovereign
immunity from suit in the federal courts is extraordinarily weak.”).
135. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1310 (discussing the claim that “the new Article III
courts would lack the power to enforce government obligations issued under the Articles of
Confederation, because those obligations had been created without the expectation of legal
enforceability”); see also JACOBS , supra note 100, at 36 (discussing an influential antifederalist tract written by Richard Henry Lee in which he noted that the states “had defaulted upon many promises made during the war, and they had not been subject to suit
for such delinquencies. Such remedies were not contemplated by either the states or their
creditors at the time the contracts were made.”).
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Eleventh Amendment is that it simply reinstated the state of affairs
where pre-War debts were once again unenforceable.136
An additional consideration militates in favor of a narrow interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, insofar as one wishes to capture the understanding of those voting for it. The Amendment’s passage required Federalist support. While the Federalists may well
have felt compelled to support the Amendment because of political
pressures, 137 they nonetheless would likely have framed the Amendment in the narrowest terms possible that would still withstand the
political pressures of the time. 138
C. Does the Amendment Preclude Federal Question Jurisdiction?
Suppose one accepts that the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment were not making a mistake, but actually intended to withdraw
federal court jurisdiction from cases involving states and foreign citizens, and that the narrowest interpretation would capture the Framers’ intent, because the Amendment could not have passed without
Federalist support. Still, even a narrow interpretation of the
Amendment—“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State” 139—suggests that
federal courts are precluded from hearing all cases where a state and
foreign citizen or subject are parties, even if a federal question is implicated.
In Missouri v. Fiske,140 the Court pointed out that the “fact that
the motive for the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment was to quiet
grave apprehensions that were extensively entertained with respect
to the prosecution of state debts in the federal courts cannot be regarded . . . as restricting the scope of the Amendment to suits to obtain money judgments.”141 After all, the Court suggested, the “terms
of the Amendment, notwithstanding the chief motive for its adoption,
were not so limited.”142 However, requiring that one pay close atten136. Pfander, supra note 6, at 1343 (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment “placed
pre-constitutional debts beyond the reach of the federal courts”).
137. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text (suggesting that those who might
benefit from Chisholm would have been very politically unpopular).
138. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1934 (“But the Federalists sought to draft the
amendment in the narrowest possible form that would serve to quiet the rapidly mobilizing
reaction to Chisholm, while leaving intact the rest of article III.”); see also Jackson, supra
note 8, at 46 (“[T]he amendment was widely supported in Congress by federalists and nonfederalists alike, suggesting that Congress did not intend a broad change in the power of
the national government.”).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added).
140. 290 U.S. 18 (1933).
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id.
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tion to the text is double-edged, since that would mean that a citizen
was not barred from suing her own state in federal court. In part because of this implication regarding whether citizens could sue their
own states in federal court, 143 the Alden Court has suggested that it
is not necessary to pay close attention to the Amendment’s wording.
The Court stated that the “Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather
than established sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle,”
and that the “scope of the States’ immunity from suit is demarcated
not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.”144
The Alden Court’s explanation for why state sovereign immunity
should exceed the limits imposed by the Eleventh Amendment is
somewhat surprising. The Court suggested that “[g]iven the outraged
reaction to Chisholm, as well as Congress’ repeated refusal to otherwise qualify the text of the Amendment, it is doubtful that if Congress meant to write a new immunity into the Constitution it would
have limited that immunity to the narrow text of the Eleventh
Amendment.”145 Yet, this argument runs counter to common experience, since it suggests that individuals in shock and rage understated
the protections that they meant to enact. One would normally expect
that anger would lead to an overstatement that would be toned down
when calmer heads could prevail. 146
Diversity theorists agree with the Court that Congress was not attempting to write a new immunity into the Constitution; they claim
that Congress was, instead, merely trying to prevent the federal
court from having diversity jurisdiction over a state on a matter of
state law. 147 As a variety of theorists have remarked, the terms of the
Amendment do not preclude citizens from suing their own states in
federal court if a federal question is at issue and it would seem
strange that in-state citizens would be allowed to do so and out-ofstate citizens would not, 148 since the latter group would seem more
143. See infra notes 148-152 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Eleventh
Amendment precludes citizens from suing their own states in federal court).
144. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999).
145. Id. at 723.
146. The claim here is not that the Amendment should be interpreted in terms of how
it would have been written had there been time for more deliberation, but that the literal
language of the Amendment supports a diversity interpretation. See infra notes 170-174
and accompanying text.
147. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1351 (“[T]he Amendment explains or clarifies that
the nominally reciprocal terms of the Article III diversity grant were not to ‘be construed
to’ extend to suits and proceedings in which a State was a party defendant. This account of
theAmendment leaves other sources of jurisdiction over suits against the states intact and
unaffected, including the provision for the exercise of jurisdiction over federal question
claims against the states.”); see also infra note 161.
148. See Marshall, supra note 118, at 1378 (“[T]here is no persuasive reason why suits
based upon federal law should be allowed in federal court when brought by an in-stater,
but should not be allowed in federal court when brought by an out-of-stater.”).
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likely to need the allegedly greater objectivity of the federal courts. 149
Further, it is not plausible to explain the noninclusion of in-staters in
the Eleventh Amendment as a mere oversight, 150 since it is quite conceivable that in-staters would need to bring an action for a violation
arising under the Constitution or federal law.151 It is thus surprising
that in-staters would not have been excluded if that had been the desire. 152
Justice Antonin Scalia has suggested that the wording of the
Eleventh Amendment itself suggests that it was designed to remove
diversity jurisdiction from the federal courts:
[T]here is no plausible reason why one would wish to protect a
State from being sued in federal court for violation of federal
law . . . when the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or country,
but to permit a State to be sued there when the plaintiff is citizen
of the State itself.153

Most commentators agree that it makes no sense to distinguish
between in-staters and out-of-staters in this way; however, they disagree about what conclusion should be drawn from that fact. Some
argue that out-of-staters were only intended to be precluded from doing what in-staters were precluded from doing,154 which is why outof-staters should not be precluded from filing in federal court if a federal question is at issue, whereas others suggest that this is why instaters should also be precluded from filing in federal court even if a
federal question is at issue. 155
149. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 390 (1821) (“State tribunals might
be suspected of partiality in cases between itself . . . and aliens, or the citizens of another
State.”); see also Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-18 (1858) (suggesting that
“the local tribunals could hardly be e xpected to be always free from . . . local influences”).
150. See Marshall, supra note 118, at 1381 (discussing the claim that “the concern motivating the framers of the eleventh amendment were the Chisholm-type suits brought for
the collection of debts, not suits against states based on some imagined federal grounds”).
151. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of protecting
all citizens’ constitutional rights).
152. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV . 1033, 1060 (1983) (“The eleventh amendment’s failure to mention in-state citizens suggests that its drafters did not intend it to reach federal
question suits, for if they intended the amendment to forbid them, their drafting was extraordinarily inept.”).
153. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“If this text were intended as a comprehensive description of
state sovereign immunity in federal courts . . . then it would unquestionably be most reasonable to interpret it as providing immunity only when the sole basis of federal jurisdiction is the diversity of citizenship that it describes . . . .”), overruled by Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
154. See Jackson, supra note 8, at 50 (“Instead, the Eleventh Amendment can be st be
interpreted to mean that out-of-staters were deprived of a federal forum only as to those
cases in which in-staters lacked a federal forum as well.”).
155. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that federal courts do not have
jurisdiction over federal questions involving states and their own citizens); Martha A.
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Justice Scalia argues that a robust version of state sovereign immunity protections can be justified only if another constitutional
principle is at work in addition to that which is provided by the Eleventh Amendment. Otherwise, “even if the parties to a suit fell within
its precise terms (for example, a State and the citizen of another
State) sovereign immunity would not exist so long as one of the
other, nondiversity grounds of jurisdiction existed.”156 Yet, if one of
the five members of the Alden majority believes that the best interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is that it only precludes federal diversity jurisdiction unless evidence or argument can be offered
to establish that some other constitutional principle is at work, one
might expect the Alden opinion to offer impressive evidence and argument to establish that thesis. One with such an expectation would
be gravely disappointed.
The Alden Court tried to bolster its claim that the Eleventh
Amendment should not be read merely to preclude federal court diversity jurisdiction by stating: “Congress’ refusal to modify the text of
the Eleventh Amendment to create an exception to sovereign immunity for cases arising under treaties . . . suggests the States’ sovereign immunity was understood to extend beyond state-law causes of
action.”157 Here, the Court was referring to a failed motion 158 made by
Albert Gallatin 159 that the Eleventh Amendment read: “The Judicial
power of the United States [except in cases arising under treaties
made under the authority of the United States] shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by
citizens or subjects of any foreign state.”160
A few points should be made about the failure to adopt this modification to the proposed amendment. First, insofar as the Eleventh
Amendment was understood merely to bar federal diversity jurisdiction, the amendment would be unnecessary.161 Second, there would
have been an important reason to reject such a modification, at least

Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
3, 6 (1997) (“[I]t has been established law for more than a hundred years that the Amendment’s prohibition applies to citizen as well as non-citizen suits.”).
156. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Alden, 527 U.S. at 734.
158. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794).
159. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1932 (discussing Gallatin and why he proposed the
amendment).
160. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794) (emphasis added).
161. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1936 (“The Gallatin proposal . . . was not needed,
since the eleventh amendment in its final form excluded from federal courts only suits
against states where jurisdiction was based exclusively on article III’s grant of party-status
jurisdiction.”).

2001]

CONFEDERATION PRINCIPLES

629

for purposes here, since its adoption would have undercut the diversity interpretation.162
Consider the Alden Court’s argument: Since there was a proposal
to make actions under the treaty subject to federal jurisdiction, it
must have been understood that without it there would be no such
jurisdiction. Yet, there is another explanation which supports the opposite conclusion. Although Gallatin was not a Federalist, 163 he nonetheless wanted the treaty with Britain enforced because it was a vital interest of his Western Pennsylvania constituents. 164 By having
his modification adopted, he might have been able to achieve two
goals at once: (1) to make the treaty enforceable in federal court, and
(2) not to make federal laws enforceable in federal court if a state was
being sued by a citizen of another state.
Article III of the Constitution states that the “judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority.”165 Suppose that Gallatin’s proposed amendment had been approved and a federal court using the
rule of interpretation “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius”166 had to
decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear a case involving a state
and a foreign citizen. That court would hold that it would have jurisdiction if the matter involved a treaty obligation but would not have
jurisdiction if, for example, the matter involved the laws of the
United States. By rejecting Gallatin’s amendment, the misperception
that federal courts would lack jurisdiction over cases with states as
parties seeking enforcement of federal law could be avoided. Thus,
Alden analysis notwithstanding, the consideration of the Gallatin
modification, coupled with the failure to adopt it, speaks as strongly
in favor of the diversity interpretation as against it.
D. On Construing the Eleventh Amendment
In United States v. Sprague,167 the Court suggested, “The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and
phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished
from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room

162. It is impossible to tell whether this was actually one of the reasons, since one of
the difficulties in interpreting the Eleventh Amendment is that while there are records of
proposed amendments to it there are no accompanying records of why those amendments
were rejected. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794).
163. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1932.
164. See id. at 1933.
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
166. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1990) (“The inclusion of one is the exclusion
of another.”).
167. 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
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for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.”168 The
question at hand is how that rule of interpretation should be used
when analyzing the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment.
One confusing issue is why the Eleventh Amendment states that
the judicial power shall not be construed to extend to certain cases
rather than stating quite simply that the judicial power shall not extend to those cases. One plain reading of the Amendment would be
that the extant Constitution should no longer be so construed, 169 especially given that the Chisholm opinion had just been issued and
the Court had construed the Constitution to grant the federal courts
jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit. 170 That is, following the line
of argument offered in Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, the Constitution should not be construed to authorize the federal courts to hear
such cases because an act of Congress would also be required for the
federal courts to exercise that jurisdiction.
If the desire had been to preclude the federal courts from hearing
cases between states and foreign citizens even when federal questions were at issue, then the Amendment should have stated either
that the judicial power simply would not extend to those cases (and
not merely that the judicial power should not be “construed” to extend to those cases) or, perhaps, that Congress was not authorized171
to grant the federal courts jurisdiction to hear those cases. 172 If indeed there was a general understanding at the time that federal
courts could hear federal issues, and that states were subject to suit

168. Id. at 731 (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
169. See Pfander, supra note 6, at 1339. Pfander states:
By the time Congress reconvened in January 1794, eight states had expressed
support for the adoption of a constitutional amendment, and had done so in
terms that suggested the need to remove or explain any provision of the Constitution that could ‘be construed’ to make states subject to suits by individuals.
Id.
170. See Vazquez, supra note 8, at 1696. Vazquez explains:
[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not give constitutional status to the states’
sovereign immunity; it merely reversed Chisholm’s holding that the Constitution itself did away with this immunity [and] . . . state sovereign immunity remains as a common law immunity . . . that, as such, . . . is subject to plenary
abrogation by Congress.
Id.
171. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 789 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he testimony of five eminent legal minds of the day confirmed that virtually everyone who understood immunity to
be legitimate saw it as a common-law prerogative (from which it follows that it was subject
to abrogation by Congress as to a matter within Congress’s Article I authority).”); Vazquez,
supra note 8, at 1696 (discussing the view that “state sovereign immunity remains as a
common law immunity, but they maintain that, as such, it is subject to plenary abrogation
by Congress”).
172. But see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (“It did not in terms prohibit suits
by individuals against the States, but declared that the Constitution should not be construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits.”) (emphasis added).
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in federal court if federal questions were implicated, 173 then the most
sensible reading of the text of the Amendment is that the jurisdiction
of the federal courts should not be construed beyond what it was already understood to be.174
When discussing the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Cohens
v. Virginia recognized that a state has an interest in having “the full
power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or
of other claims upon it.”175 However, the Court pointed out that the
state does not have an interest “in so changing the relations between
the whole and its parts, as to strip the government of the means of
protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and
laws from active violation.”176 Precisely because states are members
of a union, they cannot be permitted to thwart with impunity either
federal law or the rights of citizens granted under the federal Constitution. Thus, the Cohens Court suggested that Chisholm was
wrongly decided but that the Constitution, even with the Eleventh
Amendment, does not preclude the federal courts from having jurisdiction if federal questions are at issue, even if a state is one of the
parties. 177
In Alden, the Court suggested that the “Constitution was understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States’ traditional immunity from private suits.”178 Of course, this traditional
immunity was from private suits under state law and such an understanding would not speak to what would happen were Congress to
have entered the picture. Indeed, Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent
emphasized this very point. 179 In any event, given all of the interpretations floating around at the time and the express claims made by
many of those debating ratification that states would be subject to
suit involving federal law, the failure of the Eleventh Amendment to
read any differently counsels against the interpretation offered by
the Alden Court of the original understanding of sovereign immunity.

173. See Marshall, supra note 81, at 1350 (“[T]he majority of those who commented on
the issue concluded that the Constitution did subject states to suits in federal courts.”).
174. See John V. Orth, History and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV .
1147, 1148 (2000) (“By far the most attention . . . has been paid to the words ‘shall not be
construed.’ This phrase is often taken to indicate that the Amendment was not intended to
change the meaning of the Constitution, but only to instruct the Court as to its correct
reading.”).
175. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 407 (1821).
176. Id; see also Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1951 (“[E]ven antinationalist state court
judges did not regard the amendment as a confirmation of state sovereign immunity.”).
177. See infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text.
178. Alden, 527 U.S. at 724.
179. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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The Cohens Court analyzed the effect of the Eleventh Amendment
on federal jurisdiction,180 recognizing that the “States are constituent
parts of the United States . . . [and are] for some purposes sovereign,
for some purposes subordinate.”181 Yet, if the states are sovereign for
some purposes and subordinate for others, and if the states can neither have laws nor constitutions that are repugnant to federal law, 182
then there must be a judiciary to “give efficacy to the constitutional
laws of the legislature” and to “decide on the validity of the constitution or law of a State, if it be repugnant to the constitution or to a
law of the United States.”183 Since the “exercise of the appellate
power over those judgments of the State tribunals which may contravene the constitution or laws of the United States, is . . . essential
to the attainment of those objects [which are of vital interest to the
nation],”184 the Court suggested that the Constitution, even with the
Eleventh Amendment, must be construed to “give to the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.”185
In Cohens, the Court explained the rationale behind allowing the
federal courts to have diversity jurisdiction, that is, “jurisdiction
[which] depends on the character of the parties.”186 Because the
“State tribunals might be suspected of partiality in cases between itself or its citizens and aliens, or the citizens of another State, but not
in proceedings by a State against its own citizens,”187 it makes sense
to allow a federal court to have jurisdiction in the former case but not
in the latter. However, that argument was “not entitled to the same
force when urged to prove that this Court cannot inquire whether the
constitution or laws of the United States protect a citizen from a
prosecution instituted against him by a State.”188 The Court explained that granting jurisdiction to the federal courts was not
merely intended to circumvent the possible “partiality of the State
tribunals.”189 Rather, a more important reason “was the preservation
of the constitution and laws of the United States, so far as they can
be preserved by judicial authority; and therefore the jurisdiction of
the Courts of the Union was expressly extended to all cases arising
180. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 405 (“This leads to a consideration of the 11th
amendment.”).
181. Id. at 414.
182. See id. The “constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the
constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void.” Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 415.
185. Id. at 416. But see Marshall, supra note 81, at 1359-60 (suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment should not be so construed).
186. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 391.
187. Id.at 390.
188. Id. at 391.
189. Id.
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under that constitution and those laws.”190 He asked rhetorically, “If
the constitution or laws may be violated by proceedings instituted by
a State against its own citizens, . . . why should these cases be excepted from that provision which expressly extends the judicial
power of the Union to all cases arising under the constitution and
laws?” 191
The Cohens Court’s analysis is important to consider. It helps explain why the Chisholm Court believed it important that a suit between a state and a citizen of another state be heard in federal
court—so that the partiality of state tribunals might be avoided. It
also makes clear that one of the most important functions of the federal courts is to protect the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. Thus, a reason that might justify removing diversity jurisdiction from the federal courts over certain kinds of cases might not suffice to justify removing federal question jurisdiction over those same
kinds of cases.
The Alden Court suggested as follows:
The Court has been consistent in interpreting the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment as conclusive evidence “that the decision in
Chisholm was contrary to the well-understood meaning of the
Constitution,” and that the views expressed by Hamilton, Madison,
and Marshall during the ratification debates, and by Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm, reflect the original understanding of the Constitution.192

What is most confusing about this analysis is that it does not lead to
the robust interpretation of state sovereign immunity offered by the
Alden Court.
Suppose that Justice Iredell had convinced his Chisholm colleagues that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear that case due
to the lack of congressional authorization. 193 Suppose further that the
Eleventh Amendment had never been adopted. It seems most
unlikely that the Court’s current state sovereign immunity position
would have been adopted, at least if the idea was to reflect the intentions of the Framers, 194 even though this is exactly what the current

190. Id.
191. Id. at 391-92; see also Fallon, supra note 30, at 1144 (criticizing the federalist
model because “it fails to explain doctrines that reflect a divergent theory of federalism
that minimizes the significance of state sovereignty in comparison with national interests
and that posits a constitutional and statutory preference for federal over state courts as
the guarantors of federal rights”).
192. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999) (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 69 (1996)) (internal citation omitted).
193. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
194. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Had the question been posed,
state sovereign immunity could not have been thought to shield a State from suit under
federal law on a subject committed to national jurisdiction by Article I of the Constitution.
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Court says would have happened.195 To see why this is implausible, it
will be important to examine the Framers’ intent.
IV. THE INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS
When discussing sovereign immunity, the Alden Court relied on
its understanding of the Framers’ view of sovereign immunity. While
admitting that some members of the founding generation had a different view,196 the Court was confident that its position was shared
by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall, at least as their views were reflected in the ratification debates. 197 Yet, there are reasons to doubt
that these individuals in particular or that the Framers in general
shared the Court’s view.
A. John Marshall
It might seem surprising to suggest that John Marshall subscribed to the robust view of sovereign immunity currently articulated by the Court. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Cohens v.
Virginia, in which the Court made clear that the Eleventh Amendment merely precluded the federal courts from having diversity jurisdiction when a state was a party, and thus on its face the Alden
Court’s attribution to him of its own position is counter-intuitive.
In Cohens, Justice Marshall writing for the Court considered the
“general proposition, that a sovereign independent State is not suable, except by its own consent.”198 While admitting that this “general
proposition will not be controverted,” he pointed out that “consent is
not requisite in each particular case.”199 Instead consent “may be
given in a general law.”200 For example, consent may be given by
agreeing to become part of the Union.
To determine whether states had consented to suit by ratifying
the Constitution, Justice Marshall suggested that an examination of
“the instrument by which the surrender is made” would be required.201 Because the American states and people had been taught
Congress exercising its conceded Article I power may unquestionably abrogate such immunity.”).
195. See Field, supra note 155, at 5-6. Field explains:
One oddity of this interpretational approach is that the Court is essentially
saying the rule would be the same if the Eleventh Amendment were not there.
The redundancy is not because the Amendment is unimportant, but because
the principle it reflects lies at the root of the constitutional system.
Id.
196. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 725.
197. See id.
198. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 380 (1821).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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by experience that the “government would be a mere shadow . . .
unless invested with large portions of that sovereignty which belongs
to independent States,” the “American people, in the conventions of
their respective States, adopted the present constitution.”202 Thus,
Justice Marshall explained, the Framers had written the Constitution while cognizant of the need for the federal government to be
ceded large portions of the states’ sovereignty and, by virtue of becoming members of the Union under that constitution, the states had
surrendered much of their sovereignty.203
That surrender of sovereignty might have been limited to issues of
federal concern or might, in addition, have involved a general surrender of sovereign immunity in cases involving foreign citizens. Justice Marshall focused on the former, pointing out that the “general
government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme with respect
to those objects,”204 and that the “ample powers confided to this supreme government . . . are connected many express and important
limitations on the sovereignty of the States.”205 Thus, Justice Marshall in Cohens suggests that Chisholm was wrongly decided in that
states have the power of deciding how to adjust their debts, 206 but
that federal courts would have jurisdiction over a case involving a
state and a foreign citizen were a federal question implicated. 207
Justice Marshall considered whether “the nature of our constitution; the subordination of the State governments to that constitution;
[and] the great purpose for which jurisdiction over all cases arising
under the constitution and laws of the United States, is confided to
the judicial department” 208 would nonetheless permit a jurisdictional
“exception of those cases in which a State may be a party.”209 He suggested that the “spirit of the constitution” would not permit such an
exception, and that “a case arising under the constitution or laws of
the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever
may be the parties to that case.”210 Thus, Justice Marshall made very
clear that he would not subscribe to the analysis of sovereign immunity later offered by the Alden Court.
Lest one misunderstand his view, Justice Marshall considered the
implications of a ruling to the contrary.211 Specifically, he considered
a case holding as follows: notwithstanding that the “constitution gave
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 380-81.
See id.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 382.
See id. at 407.
See infra text accompanying notes 208-215.
Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) at 382.
Id. at 382-83.
Id. at 383.
See id. at 383-84.
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to every person having a [federal] claim upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court of the nation,”212 the Court nonetheless
could not hear the case “because the State is a party.”213 He believed
such a holding would have “mischievous consequences,” and that
these consequences could not be countenanced, since such a holding
“would prostrate . . . the government and its laws at the feet of every
State in the Union.”214 Thus, Justice Marshall made clear that “as the
constitution originally stood, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court,
in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States, was not arrested by the circumstance that a State was
a party.”215
In Cohens, Justice Marshall argued that states had surrendered
much of their sovereignty under the original Constitution. 216 This is
directly contrary to the Alden Court’s claims about Justice Marshall’s
position. However, it might be argued, Justice Marshall wrote the
majority position in Cohens years after the Constitution had been
adopted, and it would be more accurate to consult what he said at the
time of its adoption to ascertain his view or, perhaps, the views of
those voting for ratification. Indeed, Marshall’s argument in the ratification debates is cited as establishing that states would not be subject to suit in federal court, since he suggested that “[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before
a court.”217 Yet, that statement may be misleading unless consideration is given to the context in which it was made.
The Alden Court quoted much of the following passage,218 but did
not closely analyze it. During the ratification debates, Marshall addressed the issue of suits between states and citizens of other states
in the following way:
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another
state, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I
hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the
bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there
212. Id. at 383.
213. Id. at 384.
214. Id. at 385.
215. Id. at 405.
216. See JACOBS , supra note 100, at 151 (suggesting that “a waiver of the states’ immunity was altogether consonant with and even, as then understood, necessary to fulfill
the great purposes of those who framed the Constitution”).
217. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS , O N THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADE LPHIA, IN 1787, at 555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT ’S DEBATES] (quoting
John Marshall); see also Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals
Ideas: Is the Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims
Constitutional in Light of Seminole Tribe?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV . 1435, 1446 n.91 (1999)
(discussing this passage).
218. The underlined sections are not quoted by the Court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999).
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not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and
yet the State is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to
enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other
states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But,
say they, there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant—if an individual cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a
state, though he may be sued by a state. It is necessary to be so,
and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only
what cannot be avoided, why object to the system on that account?
If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it
to be presumed that, on application to its legislature, he will not
obtain satisfaction? But how could a state recover any claim from a
citizen of another state, without the establishment of these tribunals?219

Marshall claimed that the intent of Article III was “to enable
states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.”220 In
response to the argument that it would be unfair “if an individual
cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be
sued by a state,”221 Marshall said: “It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided.”222
Marshall’s response is surprising. One might wonder why “it” was
necessarily so, since the discussion assumed the possibility of two different positions (the state’s being suable or the state’s not being suable) and the question at hand was which possibility it would be. If
indeed one or the other position was necessarily so, more argument
was required.
What has been underappreciated in the primary and secondary
literature discussing Marshall’s response is that it is ambiguous.
More analysis is required to discern what he was saying. Given the
charge that it is unfair to allow states to sue but not be sued, Marshall might be claiming either of the following: (1) because it would
be unfair for a state to be able to sue but not be sued, it is necessarily
so that states are also suable, or (2) even though it is unfair that
states can sue but not be sued, that unfairness is acceptable because
it would promote the greater good.
Marshall’s next sentence is even more confusing. He suggests that
he sees a difficulty in making a state a defendant but not a plaintiff,
which at least on its face is a non sequitur because the issue at hand
is whether a state can be made a plaintiff but not a defendant. There
are at least two ways to explain his response. The first is either that
219.
220.
221.
222.

ELLIOT ’S DEBATES , supra note 217, at 555-56 (underlining added).
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id. at 556.

638

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:605

he misspoke or that his comments were transcribed incorrectly and
he really said or meant to say that he perceived difficulty in making
a state a plaintiff but not a defendant. The second explanation, which
is a little more complicated, is that the reporting is accurate, but that
he had not yet finished making his argument.
Marshall argues that it should be presumed that an individual
who has a just claim against a legislature will in fact receive satisfaction. Thus, that individual would have no need to go to court, and it
would not matter whether the state is suable. “If an individual has a
just claim against any particular state, is it to be presumed that, on
application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction?” 223 However, there is no presumption that the state will be compensated as
long as its claim is just; thus, the state may need to go to court to
press its suit against an individual. Marshall asked, “[H]ow could a
state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, without the
establishment of these tribunals?” 224 Thus, a state’s suability and its
ability to sue will be to the state’s advantage because those who
would win a judgment against the state would be paid by the legislature anyway, while the state will only be able to receive the monies it
is owed if it can avail itself of the courts.
Marshall may have been dissembling when suggesting that it
would be irrational to suppose that the sovereign would be dragged
into court because, allegedly, the sovereign would always do the right
thing.225 However, his appeal to the difficulty in making a state a defendant but not a plaintiff, while turning the question at hand on its
head, nonetheless suggests that Marshall saw the very fairness problem which Chief Justice Jay discussed in Chisholm.226
Marshall did not specify the difficulty he saw in making a state a
defendant and not a plaintiff, although he implied that it was that
the state would thereby lose financially. If that was the perceived difficulty, then an analysis is required of four possibilities: (1) the state
could be a plaintiff but not a defendant, (2) the state could be a defendant but not a plaintiff, (3) the state could be both a plaintiff and
223. Id. at 556.
224. Id. Others suggest that Marshall was denying that states could be sued and that
Marshall’s interpretation was “strained.” Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1907. The view offered
here makes Marshall more consistent.
225. Cf. Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1906 (discussing Patrick Henry’s claim that James
Madison was “dissembling” in the ratification debates). When one claims that the King or
sovereign can do no wrong, one might mean that the King/sovereign is not suable or that
the King/sovereign is incapable of acting wrongly. See Jaffe, supra note 29, at 4 (“[T]he
immunity of the sovereign from suit (sovereign immunity) and his capacity to violate or not
violate the law (‘the King can do no wrong’) are distinct and independent concepts . . . .”).
Marshall may have been appealing to the notion that the sovereign (legislature) is just and
will not do wrong.
226. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 473 (1793); see also supra text accompanying note 70.
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a defendant, and (4) the state could be neither a plaintiff nor a defendant. If the legislature would authorize the payment of all of its
just debts anyway and, presumably, the courts would not require
anything contrary to justice, 227 then the state would be a potential
loser in (2) and (4). Insofar as he was addressing the only apparently
financially advantageous position (1), Marshall implicitly was suggesting (a) that it would not in fact be financially preferable because
the state would make the same payments whether or not potentially
sued, and (b) there are other costs attached to permitting the state to
sue but not be sued, for example, perceived unfairness. If he was not
in addition arguing (b), then there would be no reason not to adopt
(1), since there would be no costs to its adoption. Thus, if he were
suggesting that the state should both be able to sue and be sued, 228
then he seems to have been taking unfairness concerns seriously.
Otherwise, the answer to the question concerning the partiality of
making states plaintiffs but not defendants would have been “Yes,
but so what?,” with no further discussion about either the presumption that legislatures would pay their debts or the implication that
states would be losers unless able both to sue and be sued.
A further point about Marshall’s discussion is in order. When
commenting about the unfairness of allowing individuals to be sued
but not to sue, he made it quite clear that he was addressing the issue of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. Where the abridgment of a constitutional right was at issue, he stated that the federal
judiciary should have jurisdiction. Marshall asked rhetorically: “To
what quarter will you look for protection from an infringement on the
Constitution, if you will not give the power to the judiciary?” 229 Further, he had already made quite clear that he was talking about the
federal judiciary, since he had just been talking about the federal
courts. Moments before, he had asked rhetorically: “Is it not necessary that the federal courts should have cognizance of cases arising
under the Constitution, and the laws, of the United States? . . .
[W]here can its jurisdiction be more necessary than here?”230
It is debatable what Marshall was saying when addressing the
unfairness of allowing states to sue but not be sued on nonfederal
questions. However, at least two points must be made: (1) interpreting him to be saying that those who can sue must also be suable
makes better sense of the entire discussion, and (2) in any event, that
227. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to see
that justice is done).
228. The proposition that states should be able to sue and be sued is implicit in Marshall’s discussion of the difficulty in permitting the state to be defendant but not plaintiff
and, presumably, in his suggesting that it would be preferable to permit the state to be
plaintiff or defendant.
229. ELLIOT ’S DEBATES , supra note 217, at 554.
230. Id. (emphasis added).
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discussion involved a state debt which would be in federal court on
diversity grounds. Marshall clearly stated that it was necessary for
federal questions to be heard in federal court, even if a state was a
party, Alden’s claims to the contrary notwithstanding.
B. James Madison
Marshall’s response was characterized by the Alden Court as providing support for Madison’s robust state sovereignty view.231 Yet,
Madison’s views in the ratification debates were not as supportive of
state sovereignty as the Alden Court implied. 232 For example, the
Court pointed to Madison’s response to the suggestion that the federal judicial power extended to controversies between a State and
Citizens of another State, namely, that the Supreme Court’s “jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state
is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the
power of individuals to call any state into court.”233
Certainly, it might be thought that this supports a robust state
sovereignty view. Yet, here, Madison was discussing federal diversity
jurisdiction. 234 Furthermore, the Court neglected to mention that in
the same address Madison had distinguished between a federal diversity case and a different kind of case that could come up in federal
court. Precisely because it was not even an issue as to whether the
latter could be heard, he spent relatively little time discussing it.
That causes of a federal nature will arise, will be obvious to every
gentleman who will recollect that the states are laid under restrictions, and that the rights of the Union are secured by these restrictions. They may involve equitable as well as legal controversies.
With respect to the laws of the Union, it is so necessary and expedient that the judicial power should correspond with the legislative, that it has not been objected to.235

Madison suggested that with respect to federal laws it was so necessary for the judicial and legislative power to correspond, that is,
that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges involving
federal laws, that no one was even questioning it. Thus, insofar as
one only looks at the ratification debates, Madison’s comments suggest both that Chisholm was wrongly decided and that federal courts
231. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
232. See id. at 2248 (“The leading advocates of the Constitution assured the people in
no uncertain terms that the Constitution would not strip the States of sovereign immunity.”).
233. Id. at 2259 (quoting ELLIOT’S DEBATES , supra note 217, at 533). A different
explanation is that Madison was dissembling here. See Gibbons, supra note 85, at 1906
(“[W]e are forced to consider a second explanation for his remarks—that, as Patrick Henry
implied, Madison was merely dissembling.”).
234. See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 217, at 531-34.
235. Id. at 532.
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should be hearing cases involving federal questions even if states
were parties.
Madison offered a similar view in the Federalist Papers. He argued that certain matters were appropriately left to the federal government and that certain matters should be left to the states. Thus,
the national “jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only,
and leaves to the several states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other subjects.”236 Here, Madison was suggesting that
the federal courts should have jurisdiction over matters of federal
concern.
Of course, there would be some question as to whether a particular matter was of national rather than state concern. Madison suggested that “in controversies relating to the boundary between the
two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be
established under the general government.”237 Thus, not only did
Madison believe that the federal courts should have jurisdiction over
cases involving federal questions even if states were involved, but he
argued that federal courts would have to decide whether federal issues were implicated in particular cases.
Madison, among others, recognized that “a right implies a remedy,”238 and allowing states a robust sovereign immunity would undermine the connection between rights and remedies. 239 Indeed,
Madison believed that it was very important that a variety of provisions of the federal constitution be enforced. “Bills of attainder, ex
post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligations of contracts, are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every
principle of sound legislation.”240 He suggested that it was therefore
quite good that the “convention added this constitutional bulwark in
favour of personal security and private rights.”241 Yet, one must wonder about the extent to which personal security and private rights
would have advanced if states would have been immune after violating these first principles of the social compact.
If Madison were confident that the states would never violate
these rights, then perhaps there would be no need to have the federal
courts available to enforce them. However, Madison believed that the
states might attempt to violate these principles, suggesting that the
236. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 195 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
237. Id.
238. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 221 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
239. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 810 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“So there is
much irony in the Court’s profession that it grounds its opinion on a deeply rooted historical tradition of sovereign immunity, when the Court abandons a principle nearly as inveterate, and much closer to the hearts of the Framers: that where there is a right, there must
be a remedy.”).
240. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 228 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
241. Id.
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“sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which
has directed the public councils.”242 Indeed, Madison suggested that
Americans “have seen with regret and with indignation, that sudden
changes, and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal
rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential
speculators; and snares to the more industrious and less informed
part of the community.”243 Thus, states might violate the very important rights that had been safeguarded by the Constitution. If the federal courts were not to have jurisdiction over state violations of federal guarantees, there would be a right without a remedy.
While Madison might have believed that nonconsenting states
could not be dragged into federal court for failing to honor contract
provisions, he certainly believed that they could be brought into federal court for violations of federal law or constitutional guarantees.
Whether one examines his comments during the ratification debates
or his writings in the Federalist Papers, one sees that Madison was
not the staunch states sovereignty advocate that the Alden Court
makes him out to be.
C. Alexander Hamilton
Of the three, Alexander Hamilton seems to be the clearest example of a Framer who had a robust state sovereignty position. The
Alden Court quoted Hamilton saying that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent,”244 and in his dissent Justice Souter seemed to
admit that Hamilton provided support for the Court’s “absolutist
view,” although Justice Souter also cautioned that “Hamilton chose
his words carefully.”245
Yet, even Hamilton’s views, properly understood, are no more
compatible with the Court’s than are the views of Marshall or Madison.246 Hamilton responded to the suggestion that “an assignment of
the public securities of one state to the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that state in the federal courts for the amount
of those securities” 247 by pointing out, “It is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without
its consent.”248 However, lest one misunderstand his point, Hamilton
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 416-17 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987)).
245. Id. at 772 (Souter, J., dissenting).
246. Justice Souter seemed to sense this when he noted Hamilton’s acknowledgement,
the “States might have surrendered sovereign immunity in some circumstances.” See id.
(Souter, J., dissenting). However, Justice Souter did not explore the point.
247. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
248. Id. at 416-17.
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wrote in the same paragraph, “Unless, therefor, there is a surrender
of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with
the states.”249
The question then becomes whether there is a surrender of that
immunity in the plan of the Convention. Hamilton argued that “there
is no colour to pretend that the state governments would, by the
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own
debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which
flows from the obligations of good faith.”250 He further argued that it
would be unwise to authorize suits against the states to force them to
pay their debts. “To what purpose would it be to authorize suits
against states for the debts that they owe?” 251
Nonetheless, Hamilton clearly believed that by becoming part of
the Union states would surrender some of their sovereignty. The only
question was the specification of the “circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of state sovereignty.”252 Hamilton suggested that “the state governments would clearly retain all the rights
of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not by that act,
exclusively delegated to the United States.”253 He then proceeded to
discuss the three cases in which this delegation or alienation of state
sovereignty would occur:

249. Id. at 417; see also Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . was modified pro tanto in 1788 to the extent that the States relinquished their sovereignty to the Federal Government. At the time
our Union was formed, the States, for the good of the whole, gave certain powers to Congress . . . .”); Fletcher, supra note 152, at 1068-69 (“[A]fter 1788, much of their sovereignty
was given up or, perhaps more accurately, was revoked and conferred upon another sovereign. The precise character of the state sovereignty that remained was not, and probably
could not have been, made clear when the Constitution was adopted.”); Jackson, supra note
8, at 81-82 (discussing Hamilton’s comments); Nowak, supra note 6, at 1429 (“In Federalist
81, Hamilton only disclaimed the power of the federal judiciary to assume jurisdiction in
damage suits against state governments; he did not maintain that Article III also denied
Congress the right to grant federal court jurisdiction over suits against states.”); Laurence
H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV . L. REV . 682, 684-85
(1976) (discussing the original understanding that states surrendered sovereign immunity
only to the extent that doing so was inherent in accepting the constitutional plan).
250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987); see
also John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 1091, 1100 (2000) (“All of the reasons [Hamilton] e xpresses in Federalist No. 81 for arguing against inherent jurisdiction over debt cases
against state governments would not apply to the issue of whether Congress could create a
regulation enforceable against state governments through court actions.”).
251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
252. Id. However, he discussed the circumstances in which states relinquished sovereignty in his article on taxation and chose not to repeat them in Federalist 81.
253. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 151-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
However, this would not entitle states to violate federal protections with impunity. See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
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where the constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the union; where it granted an authority to the union
and prohibited the states from exercising the like authority; and
where it granted an authority to the union, to which a similar authority in the state would be absolutely and totally contradictory
and repugnant.254

To illustrate his meaning, Hamilton discussed the “clause which
declares, that congress shall have power to ‘establish an UNIFORM
RULE of naturalization throughout the United States.’ This must
necessarily be exclusive; because if each state had power to prescribe
a DISTINCT RULE, there could be no UNIFORM RULE.”255 Thus,
where there was supposed to be one rule, states would neither be allowed to legislate nor to circumvent the federal rule because that
would undermine the uniformity which the Constitution had sought
to achieve when Congress was given this power exclusively.
Hamilton’s claim is important to consider. Under his view, states
have given up all sovereignty claims with respect to any of the Article I powers that have been exclusively given to Congress. Consider
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”256 Hamilton
would suggest that the state would not have sovereign immunity
with respect to issues implicating this power, Seminole Tribe v. Florida’s257 implications to the contrary notwithstanding,258 because Congress alone would have been given the power to regulate these areas
and states would undermine that authority if they could plead sovereign immunity after having contravened Congress’s will.
Hamilton made very clear that he recognized the need for enforcement of federal law against the states. 259 He said quite specifically that the “states, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited
from doing a variety of things,” and further suggested that no person
“of sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously
regarded, without some effectual power in the government to re-

254. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
255. Id.
256. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
257. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
258. See id. at 47 (“We hold that notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent to abrogate
the States’ sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that
power, and therefore § 2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be sued.”). Ironically, the Seminole Tribe Court cited Hamilton for support. See id.
at 54. However, Hamilton would have suggested that the states had given up sovereign
immunity with respect to this question when becoming part of the Union.
259. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987)
(“There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the states, of the regulations of
the federal authority were not to be expected; . . . [and that there would be] a full compliance with all the constitutional requisition of the great union. This language, at the present day, would appear . . . wild.”).

2001]

CONFEDERATION PRINCIPLES

645

strain or correct the infractions of them.”260 Thus, Hamilton, like
Madison, recognized that states would violate federal law unless
some system of effective enforcement were in place.
Hamilton discussed two different ways in which such an enforcement system might be structured. “This power must either be a direct negative on the state laws, or an authority in the federal courts,
to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles of union.”261 He then explained that the latter was “thought by
the convention preferable to the former.”262 Thus, according to Hamilton, who allegedly was a robust state sovereignty theorist and advocate, a state violating federal law would be amenable to suit in the
federal courts, even if the aggrieved party was a citizen of a foreign
state who had, for example, wrongly been subjected to a tariff on her
goods. 263
Each of the theorists cited by Alden as having a robust state sovereignty view seemed at most 264 to believe that while nonconsenting
states would not be subject to suit in federal court if state law were
at issue, they would be subject to a federal court’s jurisdiction if a
federal law were at issue. When one further considers that one of the
members of the Chisholm majority was also one of the writers of the
Federalist Papers and that two others in the majority participated in
the Constitutional Convention,265 it does not seem plausible to believe
that the Framers held the view of state sovereign immunity that has
been ascribed to them by the Court. 266
V. CONCLUSION
Chisholm was a very unpopular decision that eventually led to the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. However, Chisholm did not
involve federal question jurisdiction, and the shock that the decision
caused cannot be inferred to have involved it, especially since even

260. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 28-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987)
(discussing tariffs and duties that might be imposed by a state to protect its own citizens).
264. It is unclear how to characterize Marshall, at least from his comments in the ratification debates. See supra notes 219-230 and accompanying text.
265. See Orth, supra note 174, at 1149 (noting that “the majority included two delegates to the Constitutional Convention barely five years earlier (Justices Wilson and Blair)
and a co-author of The Federalist Papers (Chief Justice Jay)”).
266. The Court does not seem to appreciate this, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
660 n.9 (1974) (suggesting that the Framers did accept sovereign immunity even on federal
questions), although numerous commentators have suggested a view different from the
Court’s. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 6, at 1273 (“[I]n truth, many Americans from the
Federalist ranks supported state suability, and many understood Article III to have subjected states to suit in federal court to some degree.”).

646

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:605

the Chisholm dissent did consider that to be the weakness in the majority’s decision.
The Eleventh Amendment suggests that the Court should no
longer construe the Constitution as it had in Chisholm. In other
words, the Court should not read the Constitution to grant diversity
jurisdiction to the federal courts where a state and foreign citizen are
parties and only matters of state law are at issue. The Amendment
was not intended, however, to remove federal court jurisdiction when
federal questions were implicated, even if a state was one of the parties.
In Ableman v. Booth,267 the Court pointed out that “it was felt by
the statesmen who framed the Constitution, and by the people who
adopted it, that it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General Government.”268 Not only was this sovereignty surrendered, but
those setting up the Union believed that the federal government
must be “strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals,
without interruption from a State or from State authorities.”269 If
federal courts were not empowered to hear cases involving federal
law, then “the Constitution and laws and treaties of the United
States, and the powers granted to the Federal Government, would
soon receive different interpretations in different States, and the
Government of the United States would soon become one thing in one
State and another thing in another.”270 The Court noted that it was
essential to the Federal Government’s very existence that “it should
have the power of establishing courts of justice, altogether independent of State power, to carry into effect its own laws.”271
The need for one effective federal law could not be satisfied if
states were able to avoid suits in federal court by pleading sovereign
immunity. As the Framers realized, there would be, at most, a confederation of states rather than one Union, if large portions of state
sovereign immunity had not been surrendered when states ratified
the Constitution; a confederation was exactly what the Framers
sought to replace when arguing for the ratification of the Constitution.
The current sovereign immunity interpretation offered by the
Court does not represent the intentions of the Framers, claims to the
contrary notwithstanding. It may well be that at least some of the
Framers did not believe that nonconsenting states should be subject
to federal court jurisdiction on diversity grounds; however, a re267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id. at 518.
Id.
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quirement that states must always give permission to be sued by a
foreign citizen in federal court would have been too close to the bad
experience under the Articles of Confederation ever to have been acceptable
In discussing the defects of the Articles of Confederation, Alexander Hamilton suggested that “[t]he fundamental defect is a want of
power in Congress.”272 He cautioned against permitting “an uncontrolable sovereignty in each state . . . [which would] defeat the other
powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious.”273 Hamilton understood that there would be “instances without
number, where acts necessary for the general good, and which rise
out of the powers given to Congress” 274 would nonetheless be resisted
by the states, and that there would be many instances in which
states could “effectually though indirectly counteract the arrangements of Congress.”275 Unless the federal courts had jurisdiction to
hear cases in which the states were thwarting federal laws or, perhaps, were abridging the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution, the plan of the Convention would effectively be subverted.
James Madison discussed one of the difficulties of the Confederation, namely, a “want of sanction to the laws, and of coercion in the
Government of the Confederacy.”276 He suggested, “A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of Governmment. The
federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a Political Cons[ti]tution.”277 He tried to figure out from “what
cause so fatal an omission have happened in the articles of Confederation,”278 and suggested that it was “from a mistaken confidence
that the justice, the good faith, the honor, the sound policy, of the
several legislative assemblies would render superfluous any appeal
to the ordinary motives by which the laws secure the obedience of individuals.”279 He thus made clear his belief that the states would also
have to be subject to the courts and to the coercion that might be imposed there if the Constitution and the federal laws were to be the
“supreme Law of the land.”280 He, like others, had learned from previous experience under the Articles of Confederation that states

272. 1 THE FOUNDERS ’ CONSTITUTION 150 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987) (Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, September 3, 1780).
273. Id. at 151.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 167 (James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, Apr.
1787).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 167-68.
280. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
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would likely be tempted to undermine federal law and that the federal courts would have to decide when states were overstepping their
bounds.281
John Marshall argued that federal courts would have to have jurisdiction over issues involving the Constitution and federal laws. He
suggested this both in Cohens and also in the ratification debates. 282
He, like the other Framers, understood that the consequences of allowing states to plead sovereign immunity when violating federal law
or abridging individual rights under the Constitution would be too
“mischievous” 283 to be tolerated.
The current Court claims to base its robust state sovereign immunity view on the intentions of the Framers. Yet, the Framers had just
experienced the consequences of having a weak central government
where states might put their own perceived interests over the interests of the nation as a whole. The Framers understood what the
Court apparently does not: unless states can be forced to appear in
federal court, they will violate federal law and subvert national interests with impunity, whether directly or indirectly. 284 The Court’s
current interpretation of state sovereign immunity does not comport
with the language of the Constitution, the Framers’ intentions, or a
policy likely to promote the interests of the nation as a whole, and
must be corrected at the first opportunity.

281. See supra text accompanying note 238.
282. See supra notes 198-230 and accompanying text.
283. See supra text accompanying note 214.
284. While this is mitigated because of the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), that doctrine will not do the trick entirely, as Seminole Tribe suggests, see Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (holding that Young did not allow the instant suit to be brought
against a state official), because the Court’s current rationale would support restricting
Young protections. If indeed a state sovereignty is as robust as the current Court suggests,
the Young exception, which permits suit against state officials for injunctive relief even
without the state’s consent, would seem difficult to justify.

